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Modern ecology has re-emphasized the need for a quantitative understanding of the original
’survival of the fittest theme’ based on analyzis of the intricate trade-offs between competing evo-
lutionary strategies that characterize the evolution of life. This is key to the understanding of
species coexistence and ecosystem diversity under the omnipresent constraint of limited resources.
In this work we propose an agent based model replicating a community of interacting individuals,
e.g. plants in a forest, where all are competing for the same finite amount of resources and each
competitor is characterized by a specific growth-reproduction strategy. We show that such an evo-
lution dynamics drives the system towards a stationary state characterized by an emergent optimal
strategy, which in turn depends on the amount of available resources the ecosystem can rely on.
We find that the share of resources used by individuals is power-law distributed with an exponent
directly related to the optimal strategy. The model can be further generalized to devise optimal
strategies in social and economical interacting systems dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Living systems evolve and adapt to survive in an evolutionary tussle. One of the main driving forces of natural
selection [1, 2] is the competition for resources that regulates survival, growth and reproduction rates. The game
of life is orchestrated through an optimization program that releases energy through offspring production while
simultaneously trying to conserve it through an evolutionary feedback mechanism. Growth is the key ingredient to
succeed in competition with other individuals, while reproduction promotes colonization through offspring thereby
avoiding extinction.
Both empirical and theoretical evidences suggest that a trade-off across species between competition and colonization
ability [3–6] promotes coexistence: the good competitors are typically bad colonizers whereas the good colonizers
are bad competitors. The essential idea here is borrowed from a well known ecological theory, the r/K selection
theory [7, 8]. This theory states that in ecosystems with access to large (read infinite) resources. the long time
dynamics approaches a stable equilibrium with higher growth and lower reproduction rates for the interacting agents
(K-strategy). On the contrary, in unstable environments with scarce resources, the individuals procreates more, but
have smaller biomasses (r-strategy). The impact of trade-offs in competition strategies on biodiversity maintenance has
also been investigated in more recent theoretical models known as trade-off models [9, 10]. Both stochastic individual
based models [9, 11] and resource competition models in the Lotka-Volterra form [6, 12] have shown that the inclusion
of the trade-offs traits positively affect the maintenance of species diversity within single and multi-trophic ecological
communities. Even in the deterministic limit, excluding all dynamic stochasticity, optimal and evolutionary stable
trade-offs have been quantified for a structured rotifer population preying on a dynamically varying food supply [13].
The present article will focus on an optimal trade-off between growth (through competition) and reproduction
(trough colonization) while simultaneously incorporating all inherent stochastic fluctuations due to natural birth,
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II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
The model is defined as a birth-death-growth stochastic process in the continuous time limit. It consists of a
community of agents competing for a finite amount of resources R. Each agent uses a fraction of resources R at any
given time, e.g. at the time t the i-th individual uses an amount of resources i(t) such that
∑
i i(t) = R. In our
analysis, we assume R to be a constant parameter, while the number of individuals in the community N(t) varies
during the process and, at stationarity, it fluctuates around its time averaged value.
The population of the community remains unchanged until one of the N(t) individuals dies. Death events occur
with a rate d N(t), given that each individual has a constant death rate d, independent of its history, resource usage
or age. The k-th individual, which is uniformly drawn from the pool of the N(t) individuals, dies and ∗ := k(t)
resources are instantly shared by the rest of individuals in the community. Individuals use those resources to grow
or to have a progeny. Each individual is characterized by a balance between these two processes, that is quantified
in terms a parameter pi. With probability pi (or 1 − pi) the i-th individual uses the available energy to produce
offspring, i.e. new individuals in the system, or to grow. This complementarity reflects the facts that both growth
and reproduction requires energy allocation, and the individuals have to find a balance between the two tasks.
We implement the above growth/birth process in the following way. When an individual dies it frees a quantity
of resources ∗. The rest of the community is divided into two disjoint subsets, B and G: the i-th individual
has a probability pi (or 1 − pi) to belong to the set B (or G), that is, it chooses the move birth (growth). The
quantity of freed resources that the i-th individual manages to use is proportional to its own energy i. This choice
is solely decided by the following fact: bigger an individual is, more resources it will consume in order to survive.
Furthermore this hypothesis is consistent with the von Bertalanffy equation of ontogenetic growth [14–16]. If we
define Eb =
∑
i∈B i (Eg =
∑
i∈G i) as the sum of the energies of the individuals that have chosen the move birth
(growth) then the total energy allocated for the births is ∗Eb/(Eg +Eb), where the relation Eg +Eb = R− ∗ holds.
Each new generated individual uses a fixed amount of resources (0) > 0. This parameter defines the minimal
biomass of an individual. Given this “minimal energy” (0), the number nb of new individuals added to the system
is given by the largest integer less than (∗/(0))Eb/(Eg+Eb), i.e. nb = b(∗/(0))Eb/(Eg+Eb)c, where b·c indicate the
floor function. The pi values of these new individuals are inherited from their parents: for each of the nb progenies,
the i-th individual belonging to the subset B has probability i/Eb to transmit its pi. Individuals belonging to the
subset G grow exploiting the remaining energy g ≡ ∗ − nb(0) (i.e., energy not used for procreation). Therefore, the
energy of the i-th individual belonging to G changes as i → i(1 + g/Eg).
The dynamics defined above conserves the total resource R of the ecosystem, but do not conserve the total number
of individuals in the community. If the fluctuations of the total population N drive the system to the state N = 0,
then the dynamics stops. If the system reaches the N = 0 state, we initialize the system to a new configuration
with R/(0) individuals (of energy (0)). This choice may be interpreted as immigrations of outside species in the
the community. The proposed community dynamics also has “non-trivial” absorbing states. These are related to
the strategy p: if all the individuals share the same strategy p there is no way to introduce a new individual with
a different p in the ecosystem. Therefore the stationary state of the ecosystem dynamics will be characterized by
3one final strategy p and not by a mixture of heterogeneous pi. From a theoretical point of view the number of these
possible absorbing states is infinite (one for each value of p).
III. FIXED p
A. Numerical simulations
The simulations of the community dynamics are performed using Gillespie’s algorithm. The system is initialized at
time t = 0 with N(0) = R individuals having the same energy usage ((0)=1) and the same value of p. The structure
of the community depends on R and p. The main goal of the simulations is to study this dependence.
Suppose that at time t there are N(t) individuals in the ecosystems and that a death event occurs at time τ > t.
Each individual has a constant death rate d, and therefore τ is a random variable with exponential distribution and
average 1/dN(t). At time τ , we randomly remove an agent that frees its resource ∗. The remaining individuals
identically compete to gain their shares of the released resources.
The number of individuals, N(t), is a random variable, whose average at stationarity depends on both R and p.
Numerical simulations, shown in Fig. 1, indicates that
〈
N
〉
= bpR with b = 0.64± 0.02, which is compatible with our
analytical estimate b = 2/3 given in section III B.
The community is characterized in terms of the distribution of resource usage among individuals as measured by
n(|p,R)d, the average number of individuals in the energy interval (,  + d) when all the individuals share the
same value of p. Figure 2A shows that resources are distributed with a truncated power-law with an exponent −α(p)
depending on p. As expected smaller the values of p is (competition strategy biased favorably), smaller is the absolute
value of exponent of the distribution.
The cut-off of the distribution of order R suggests that finite size scaling [17] is a good candidate to describe the
behavior of the resource usage in the community. This corresponds to the assumption that n(|p,R) = α(p)f(/R),
where f(x) tends to a constant value for small arguments whereas it rapidly approaches zero when the argument
increases. If finite size scaling holds the plot of α(p)n(|p,R) (or equivalently that of α(p)−1 ∫∞

n(x|p,R)dx for a
better statistics) versus /R should give a single data collapsed curve instead of multiple curves for different values of
R. The quality of the collapse we get (see Fig. 2B) is consistent with the finite size scaling ansatz.
B. Mean-field approximation
In this section, we perform a mean field approximation in order to derive both the power law decay and an estimate
of the decay exponent as a function of p. The time evolution of the energy usage distribution in the mean field
approximation is given by (from now on we shall omit the p and R dependence in n(|p,R) in order to simplify the
notation)
∂n(, t)
∂t
= −d n(, t) + d 〈N(t)〉〈nb〉δ(− (0))+
d
〈
N(t)
〉
(1− p)
[ 1
D
n
( 
D
, t
)− n(, t)] , (1)
4where the first term represents the decay of n(, t) due to random death events, the second term takes into account
the birth events, which are
〈
nb
〉
on average, while the third term represents growth.
〈
N(t)
〉
is the total number of
individuals (i.e.
〈
N(t)
〉
=
∫
dn(, t)) and D is the updated energy usage of all individuals belonging to the growing
set which originally had a resources usage equal to  with
D = 1 +
〈
∗
〉− 〈nb〉(0)
(1− p)(R− 〈∗〉) . (2)
From equations 1 and 2 one has D(∗) =
〈
1 + g/Eg
〉
= 1 +
〈
(∗ − nb(0))/Eg
〉 ≈ 1 + (〈∗〉 − 〈nb〉(0))/〈Eg〉 where〈
Eg
〉
= (1−p)(R− 〈∗〉). The amount of freed resources at time t depends on the probability that an individual with
a resource usage ∗ dies. Since the individual chosen to die is randomly selected, we have
〈
∗
〉
=
〈 ∫
dn(, t)/N
〉 ≈
R/
〈
N
〉
. At stationarity n(, t) = n() and, therefore,

∂n()
∂
= −2− b
1− bn() +
b
1− b
R
(0)
δ(− (0)) , (3)
where
b =
〈
nb
〉
(0)
〈
N
〉
/R , (4)
here we assumed that
〈
∗
〉
/R ∼ 0 ,i.e. |D − 1| ∼ 0, which allows us to expand n(/D, t) in eq. (1) in order to get
eq. 5. The solution of this equation for  > (0) is the power law
n() =
1
(0)
b
1− b
R
(0)
( 
(0)
)−α
Θ(− (0)), α = 2− b
1− b . (5)
This solution is consistent since
∫
d n()  = R without having to explicitly impose it, whereas
〈
N
〉
=
∫
d n() =
Rb/(0) implying that b = (0)
〈
N
〉
/R and so
〈
nb
〉
= 1. Since
〈
nb
〉
is the average number of births per dead individual,
at stationarity
〈
nb
〉
= 1 assures a community of constant average size. On the other hand the average value of nb can
be explicitly written as 〈
nb
〉
=
∫
d∗
〈n(∗)
N
〉⌊ p∗
(0)
R
R− ∗
⌋
≈
∫
d∗
n(∗)〈
N
〉 ⌊ p∗
(0)
⌋
=
1〈
N
〉 p
(0)
∞∑
i=1
i
(0)
p
∫ i+1
p 
(0)
i
p 
(0)
d∗n(∗) . (6)
If we simply remove the floor function from the above expression we would obtain b(p) = p. In order to get a better
approximation we estimate the series in eq. (6) by evaluating the total resource, R, as follows
R =
∫
d n()  ≈
∞∑
i=1
(i+
1
2
)
(0)
p
∫ i+1
p 
(0)
i
p 
(0)
d n() (7)
where we have use the “mid-point prescription” to approximate the first term in the integrand, , in the interval
(i(0)/p, (i+1)(0)/p). Using the previous two equations and the definition of
〈
N
〉
, we get R =
〈
N
〉
(0)(
〈
nb
〉
+1/2)/p =
3
〈
N
〉
(0)/(2p) which leads to b = 2p/3. Therefore we predict the exponent of the power-law distribution to be equal to
(6− 2p)/(3− 2p). Figure 3 shows the analytical prediction of the exponent versus the results of numerical simulation.
Apart from a mismatch for very small values of p the agreement is quite satisfactory. This mismatch is due to the fact
that the smaller the value of p is, the bigger is
〈
∗
〉 ≈ R/〈N〉 = 3(0)/2p, which we assumed to be very small with
respect to R. Moreover when p is small, the integration interval in eq. (6) is wide, and the “mid-point prescription”
becomes less accurate. The mid-point prescription used in eq. (6) fails if p > 1− 1/N and a better approximation
is obtained by removing the floor function.
5IV. EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY: OPTIMAL p AS A FUNCTION OF THE RESOURCES
The next step is to investigate the fate of an inhomogeneous system with randomly drawn p’s for the individuals
in the community. As already observed, the system reaches a state with a unique value of p. However given that
the dynamics is stochastic the selected final p is not unique even in the case of the system starting from the same
initial state. Figure 4A shows the distribution of the final values of p, P (1)(p) when we initialize the system with
N0 individuals each with an energy usage 
(0) ( R = N0
(0)), and a uniform distribution of p’s, P (0)(p), between 0
and 1. Quite interestingly P (1)(p) is not uniform as the initial distribution, P (0)(p), but rather it is peaked around
a certain value, p∗(R), that depends on R. Indeed, the center of the distribution gives the optimal p∗(R) value.
In fact, by drawing the initial values of p from P (1)(p), we obtain a narrower distribution, P (2)(p) (see Fig. 4B),
and for each iteration the distribution becomes narrower and narrower and centered around p∗(R). In the limit of
S → ∞ steps, P (S)(p) converges to a delta function. This result is independent of the initial distribution we choose
as far as it is different from zero at p∗(R). Therefore the optimal strategy p∗(R) is evolutionary selected by the
community dynamics depending on the ecosystem total resources R. If R is small the population sizes are also small
and demographic fluctuations can lead to rapid extinction. In this condition large values of p are selected, favoring
procreation with respect to individual growth, and thus promoting the persistence of the ecosystem population. On
the other hand, if the available resources are large, demographic fluctuations are less dangerous and species develop
a strategy in order to gain the highest share of the available resources, i.e. they prefer to grow and small p strategies
are favored.
A natural follow-up of the previous analysis is an attempt to understand whether p∗(R) is an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS). If a population adopts the ESS, it cannot be invaded by a population with another strategy. In the
context of a stochastic dynamics every strategy can in principle be invaded, even if it is the optimal one, just because
of demographic fluctuations. The ESS is thus defined as the strategy whose probability to invade another strategy is
always higher than the probability to be invaded. In other words, given two strategies, say p∗ and p, p∗ is the ESS if
Pfix(p
∗ → p|n(0),m(0)) > Pfix(p→ p∗|n(0),m(0)) ∀p 6= p∗ , (8)
where, given any two strategies p1 and p2, Pfix(p1 → p2|n,m) = limt→∞ P (n > 0,m = 0, t|n = n(0),m = m(0), t = 0)
and P (n > 0,m = 0, t|n = n(0),m = m(0), t = 0) is the probability that starting at t = 0 with n(0) individuals with p1
and m(0) individuals with p2, at time t all individuals adopt the p1 strategy. The existence of an ESS and its value is
independent of the particular choice for n(0) and m(0). We set n(0) = m(0). Figure 5 highlights that p∗(R) is indeed
an evolutionary stable strategy.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our stochastic birth-death-growth model rationalizes the emergence of an optimal trade-off between growth (com-
petition) and reproduction (colonization) strategies in evolving living systems relying on a finite pool of resources.
The dynamical evolution of the system spontaneously selects the optimal competition/colonization strategy to best
cope with the environment: if the pool of available resources is small, procreation is deemed a better strategy with
respect to individual growth; on the other hand, if the available resources are large, growth (competition) is favored.
6Our results are in agreement with empirical evidences: for instance, it has been observed [18, 19] that in populations
with high densities of individuals competition abilities are favored, while when the density of individuals is low, much
more effort is dedicated towards reproduction.
Our model also predicts a power-law distribution of resources among individuals, and allows us to relate it with
the optimal trade-off strategy for the system. Indeed, the exponent of the power-law characterizing the resources
distribution depends on the trade-off between growth and reproduction and therefore it is directly related to the
availability of resources. Power-law emerges because of the “rich get richer” feature of the individuals growth, and
therefore it is not unexpected since preferential attachment mechanisms are known to produce power-laws. Indeed,
scale-free distributions of resources among individuals are found in several different contexts: in social systems the
wealth among individuals is usually described by a Pareto distribution [20]. In the context of economy the sizes
and incomes of companies follow the Zipf’s power law [21, 22]; In forest science power-law distribution of plants
height - which correlates with resources usage - has also been recently reported [23]. Interestingly, though, usually
these resource distributions show non-universal power law exponents[24]. For instance distributions of firm sizes have
exponents that depend on the firm’ sector type [22] or the distribution of family names has a power law decay with an
exponent varying from 1.83 in the US to about 1 in Korea [24]. Therefore our theoretical framework can be properly
generalized to model systems also in these different fields of science and to elucidate connection between the exponent
of the power-law distributions of resources and the optimal trade-off strategy, which in turn depends on the quantity
of available resources.
The proposed model is just the starting point for more complicated dynamics where more complex ingredients
may be incorporated. In ecology space plays an important role, as all individuals compete within a certain area.
Therefore the proposed model can be seen as a mean-field version of a spatially explicit model, where the quantity of
resources R plays the role of an effective parameter that quantifies the amount of resources and space one individual
typically competes for. Similarly space plays a key role also in sociological and economical systems, where the network
determining agents specific interactions may display complex topological properties.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank T. Anfodillo, J.R. Banavar, C. Borile, F. Simini and L. Tamburino for insightful discussions and Cariparo
foundation for financial support. We are particularly thankful to S.M. Bhattacharjee and A.K. Chattopadhyay for a
very helpful critical reading of the manuscript.
[1] CR Darwin. The Origin of Species. The Harvard Classics. New York.
[2] HM Wilbur, DW Tinkle, and JP Collins. Environmental Certainty, Trophic Level, and Resource Availability in Life History
Evolution. The American Naturalist, 108(964), 1974.
[3] a R Kraaijeveld, E C Limentani, and H C Godfray. Basis of the trade-off between parasitoid resistance and larval
competitive ability in Drosophila melanogaster. Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society, 268(1464):259–61,
February 2001.
7[4] Maja Novak, Thomas Pfeiffer, Richard E Lenski, Uwe Sauer, and Sebastian Bonhoeffer. Experimental tests for an evolu-
tionary trade-off between growth rate and yield in e. coli. The American Naturalist, 168(2):242–251, 2006.
[5] V. Calcagno, N. Mouquet, P. Jarne, and P. David. Coexistence in a metacommunity: the competition-colonization trade-off
is not dead. Ecology Letters, 9(8):897–907, 2006.
[6] Peter Chesson and Jessica J Kuang. The interaction between predation and competition. Nature, 456(7219):235–8,
November 2008.
[7] Robert H. MacArthur and Edward O. Wilson. The Theory of Island Biogeography. Princeton University Press, 1967.
[8] Eric R. Pianka. On r- and k-selection. The American Naturalist, 104(940):pp. 592–597, 1970.
[9] Helene C Muller-landau and Simon A Levin. Comparing Classical Community Models : Theoretical. American Naturalist,
159(1), 2002.
[10] JM Kneitel and JM Chase. Trade-offs in community ecology: linking spatial scales and species coexistence. Ecology Letters,
7(1):69–80, JAN 2004.
[11] E Bertuzzo, S Suweis, L Mari, A Maritan, I Rodriguez-Iturbe, and A Rinaldo. Spatial Effects on Species Persistence
and Implications for Biodiversity. Proceeding of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America,
108(11):4346–4351, March 2011.
[12] P J Wangersky. Lotka-volterra population models. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 9(1):189–218, 1978.
[13] Kyle W Shertzer and Stephen P Ellner. Energy storage and the evolution of population dynamics. Journal of theoretical
biology, 215(2):183–200, 2002.
[14] L von Bertalsnffy. Quantitative laws in metabolism and growth. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 32(3):217.
[15] G. B. West, J. H. Brown, and B. J. Enquist. A general model for ontogenetic growth. Nature, 413:628–631, October 2001.
[16] J. R. Banavar, J. Damuth, A. Maritan, and A. Rinaldo. Ontogenetic growth (Communication arising): Modelling univer-
sality and scaling. Nature, 420:626, December 2002.
[17] Michael E. Fisher and Michael N. Barber. Scaling theory for finite-size effects in the critical region. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
28:1516–1519, Jun 1972.
[18] Laurence D Mueller, Pingzhong Guo, Francisco J Ayala, et al. Density-dependent natural selection and trade-offs in life
history traits. Science(Washington), 253(5018):433–435, 1991.
[19] Fla´via Freitas Coelho, Liene Deboni, and Frederico Santos Lopes. Density-dependent reproductive and vegetative allocation
in the aquatic plant pistia stratiotes (araceae). Revista de biolog´ıa tropical, 53(3-4):369–376, 2005.
[20] C Kleiber and S Kotz. Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actuarial Sciences. Wiley & Sons, New York.
[21] K Okuyama, M Takayasu, and H Takayasu. Zipf’s law in income distribution of companies. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics
and its Applications, 269(1):125–131, July 1999.
[22] R L Axtell. Zipf distribution of U.S. firm sizes. Science (New York, N.Y.), 293(5536):1818–20, September 2001.
[23] Filippo Simini, Tommaso Anfodillo, Marco Carrer, Jayanth R. Banavar, and Amos Maritan. Self-similarity and scaling in
forest communities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(17):7658–62,
April 2010.
[24] Seung Ki Baek, Sebastian Bernhardsson, and Petter Minnhagen. Zipf’s law unzipped. New Journal of Physics, 13(4):043004,
April 2011.
80 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
N
R=1000
R=5000
R=10000
0 5000 10000
R
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
N
p=0.2
p=0.5
p=0.8A B
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p under the proposed ecosystem dynamics modeling. Numerical simulations (points of different colors/shapes) show a linear
relation of the form
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〉
= bpR/(0), with a b = 0.64 ± 0.02. The simulation were performed with (0) = 1 and averages were
performed over 100 realizations. Lines represent analytical mean-field prediction
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= (2/3)pR/(0) obtained in section III B,
where the proportionality constant is predicted to be b = 2/3.
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plotted matrices represents the probability Pfix(pj → pi) that the species with the pi becomes extinct whereas the one with
pj spreads through all the system (i, j = 1, . . . , 20). The optimal stratgy (ESS) corresponds to the choice of p which has a
probability greater than 1/2 to be fixed against any other possible value of p. The value of p∗(R) depends on the quantity of
available resources R and it is plotted in the inset of Fig. 4A.
